recent decades tax law changes that altered the nature of the hybrid were generally not discussed as part of a plan to establish either a pure income tax or a pure consumption tax, but as attempts to establish a "level playing field" or to improve "incentives to save." 1 As of 2003, the outline of an explicit plan to move toward a consumption tax is emerging.
Under the original Bush administration proposals in 2003, dividends would become tax-exempt if corporate tax had been paid on the earnings supporting the dividends, and a new tax-exempt Lifetime Savings Account, with no restrictions on use, would be created.
The proposed expansion of tax-exempt savings accounts was not passed, although it will likely be re-introduced in some form. What did become law were two provisions to expand expensing of qualified property: (1) an increase in the fraction of equipment investment that can be immediately written off from 30 percent (which became law in 2002) to 50 percent, and (2) an increase through 2005 of the limit on the expensing of new depreciable assets by small businesses allowed under IRC Section 179. The 2003 tax law also reduced the rate of tax on dividends and realized capital gains received by an individual shareholder to be no more than 15 percent, compared to a top rate on "ordinary" income of 35 percent.
The acceleration of depreciation, the reduction of personal tax on dividends, and an expansion of tax-favored savings accounts can be seen as part of a strategy to shift the tax base from income to consumption. 2 If the ultimate destination of this set of tax reforms is a consumption tax base, then the most glaring omission from the discussion to date concerns interest deductibility. The continuation of interest deductibility, in spite of other moves toward a consumption tax base, raises two issues. The first is that interest deductibility plus expensing for businesses, plus exemption of financial returns of individuals produces not a zero tax on capital income, as under a consumption tax, but rather a subsidy. The second is that this tax structure allows a range of tax arbitrage opportunities among individuals and across corporations and individuals. For example, even under pre-2002 tax law, when high-tax-bracket investors borrowed from those in low (or zero) tax brackets they generated an arbitrage gain equal to the difference between the tax rates. Reducing the tax rate on interest income, but not interest deductions, to zero vastly expands this opportunity. These tax arbitrage opportunities reduce tax revenue without necessarily providing a concomitant reduction in the effective tax rate on saving and investment.
I. Methodology
In this paper we investigate the extent to which the U.S. income tax system of 2004 collects tax on capital income, and the implications of extending tax-preferred savings accounts.
We do so by applying a methodology originally proposed in Roger Gordon and Joel Slemrod (1988) There are many tax structures that imply no distortions at the margin to saving and investment decisions. For several reasons discussed in Roger Gordon et al. (2004a) , we examine the R-base. Shifting to an R-base tax would involve replacing current deductions for depreciation, amortization, and depletion with immediate expensing for new investment. In addition, it requires eliminating interest, dividend, and capital gains from the tax base and also eliminating all interest deductions. Finally, it is necessary to allow an immediate deduction when goods are added to inventory rather than a deduction when goods are withdrawn from inventory.
3 How this measure relates to an average effective tax rate on saving and investment is discussed at length in Roger Gordon et al. (2004b) .
Strikingly, Gordon and Slemrod (1988) concluded that in 1983 in the United States the switch to an R-base tax would have cost little or no revenue, suggesting that the tax burden on capital was at that time small or non-existent. The methodology was refined in Gordon et al. (2004a, hereafter GKS) and applied to the U.S. tax system of 1995. 4 The findings for 1995 were less stark: a switch to an R-base tax in 1995 was estimated to cost $108.1 billion in tax revenues.
Much had happened between 1983 and 1995, including the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and a significant drop in nominal interest rates that reduced the tax savings arising from any tax arbitrage through use of debt.
II. Results
In this paper we apply the GKS methodology to the U. Table 3 provides detail on the steps taken to convert actual 2004 tax revenue to the revenue that would be collected under an R-base individual tax.
Moving to an R-base would exempt $626.1 billion of interest receipts and other capital income, but also disallow $357.8 billion of interest deductions, for a net drop of $268.2 billion in taxable income. 9 The total reduction in taxable income is $293.3 billion, resulting in a decline of $33.7 billion in tax liability, as reflected in the difference between the second and third columns of the second row of Table 1 . The ratio of the change in tax liability to the change in taxable income is just 11.5%, similar to the ratio in 1995, reflecting the fact that the disallowed interest deductions are concentrated among those in the top tax brackets whereas the exempted capital income tends to be received by those in low tax brackets. Depending on which simulation procedure we employ, the expanded tax-free savings accounts push the U.S. tax system beyond a consumption tax in the sense that revenue would be lost from taxes on capital income. Comparing the fourth and second columns of Table 1 shows that exempting $25,000 ($12,500) of interest, dividends, and capital gains from taxable income would in the long run reduce individual income tax revenue by $43.3 billion and, as shown in parentheses, completely exempting these items (in both cases retaining interest deductibility)
would cost $107.6 billion in individual income tax revenue. 10 The net result is that, depending on how we model the long-run revenue cost of expanded tax-free savings accounts, the total revenue collected from capital income will either be just $20.5 billion ($991.0 -$970.5) or will be minus $43.8 billion ($926.7 -$970.5).
III. Conclusions
As of 2004, the U.S tax system has returned to the situation of the mid-1980's wherein our income tax system raises little revenue from taxing capital income. If extensive tax-free savings accounts were to be introduced, the system would raise almost no revenue from capital income and possibly subsidize, rather than tax, capital income. The main culprit in this state of affairs is the retention of interest deductibility. Although the revenue from taxing capital income is small, the gains that would result from a clean consumption tax have not been attained, as there remain distortions to both saving and investment decisions, and distortions across capital assets, portfolios, corporate financing, and choice of organizational form under the patchwork of provisions that have been adopted. 9 There is a further $25.1 billion indirect reduction in taxable income due to the effect of the phaseout of itemized deductions and personal exemptions based on adjusted gross income (AGI) and the limitation on itemized deductions--the $357.8 billion in disallowed interest deductions is a gross value before the limitation on itemized deductions is applied. When calculating the revenue impact of moving to an R-base tax, due to data limitations it is assumed that all capital income that is subject to the regular tax is excluded from both the regular base and the alternative than the regular tax, this leads us to slightly underestimate the revenue loss from moving to the R-base tax.
10 For the first estimate, we assume that individuals first deposit into the accounts assets yielding interest income, short-term capital gains, and dividends not eligible for the preferential rates, and then deposit assets yielding dividends and long-term capital gains, until the limit is reached.
That behavior would minimize tax liability. We ignore any increase in borrowing to finance further deposits in these accounts.
